Paper 2010/624 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/624 ↗
No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method
Abstract
We propose a class of authentication schemes that are literally zero-knowledge, as compared to what is formally defined as ``zero-knowledge" in cryptographic literature. We call this ``no-leak" authentication to distinguish from an established ``zero-knowledge" concept. The ``no-leak" condition implies ``zero-knowledge" (even ``perfect zero-knowledge"), but it is actually stronger, as we illustrate by examples. The principal idea behind our schemes is: the verifier challenges the prover with questions that he (the verifier) already knows answers to; therefore, even a computationally unbounded verifier who follows the protocol cannot possibly learn anything new during any number of authentication sessions. This is therefore also true for a computationally unbounded passive adversary.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2012-02-08: last updated
- 2010-12-08: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/624
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/624,
author = {Dima Grigoriev and Vladimir Shpilrain},
title = {No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/624},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/624}
}