Paper 2010/636 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2010/636 ↗
Differential Fault Analysis of AES using a Single Multiple-Byte Fault
Abstract
In this paper we present an improved fault attack on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This paper presents an improvement on a recently published differential fault analysis of AES that requires one fault to recover the secret key being used. This attack requires that one byte entering into the eighth round is corrupted. We show that the attack is possible where more than one byte has been affected. Experimental results are described where a fault is injected using a glitch in the clock, demonstrating that this attack is practical.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2010-12-15: last updated
- 2010-12-15: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/636
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/636,
author = {Subidh Ali and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay and Michael Tunstall},
title = {Differential Fault Analysis of AES using a Single Multiple-Byte Fault},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/636},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/636}
}