Paper 2011/017 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/017 ↗
New Impossible Differential Attacks of Reduced-Round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256
Abstract
Camellia is a block cipher selected as a standard by ISO/IEC, which has been analyzed by a number of cryptanalysts. In this paper, we propose several 6-round impossible differential paths of Camellia with the $FL/FL^{-1}$ layer in the middle of them. With the impossible differential and a well-organized precomputational table, impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 are given, and the time complexity are $2^{175}$ and $2^{206.8}$ respectively. An impossible differential attack on 15-round Camellia-256 without $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers and whitening is also be given, which needs about $2^{236.1}$ encryptions. To the best of our knowledge, these are the best cryptanalytic results of Camellia-192/-256 with $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers and Camellia-256 without $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers to date.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-01-19: last updated
- 2011-01-10: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/017
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/017,
author = {Jiazhe Chen and Keting Jia and Hongbo Yu and Xiaoyun Wang},
title = {New Impossible Differential Attacks of Reduced-Round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/017},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/017}
}