Paper 2011/099 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/099 ↗
Can Code Polymorphism Limit Information Leakage?
Abstract
In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As one can easily imagine, real-life devices are not ideal and information may leak through different physical side-channels. It is a known fact that information leakage is a function of both the executed code $F$ and its input $x$.\smallskip In this work we explore the use of polymorphic code as a way of resisting side channel attacks. We present experimental results with procedural and functional languages. In each case we rewrite the protected code code $F_i$ before its execution. The outcome is a genealogy of programs $F_0,F_1,\ldots$ such that for all inputs $x$ and for all indexes $i \neq j \Rightarrow F_i(x)=F_j(x)\mbox{~and~}F_i\neq F_j$. This is shown to increase resistance to side channel attacks.\smallskip
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-03-02: last updated
- 2011-02-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/099
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/099,
author = {Antoine Amarilli and Sascha Müller and David Naccache and Daniel Page and Pablo Rauzy and Michael Tunstall},
title = {Can Code Polymorphism Limit Information Leakage?},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/099},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/099}
}