Paper 2011/103 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/103 ↗
Cryptographically Sound Security Proof for On-Demand Source Routing Protocol EndairA
Abstract
We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of a routing protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks. More precisely, we show that the route discovery protocol does not output a non-existing path under arbitrary active attacks, where on a non-existing path there exists at least one pair of neighboring nodes without communication connection during the run of the route discovery protocol. The proof relies on the Dolev-Yao-style model of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner, which allows for mapping results obtained symbolically within this model to cryptographically sound proofs if certain assumptions are met.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-03-05: last updated
- 2011-03-05: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/103
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/103,
author = {István Vajda},
title = {Cryptographically Sound Security Proof for On-Demand Source Routing Protocol EndairA},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/103},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/103}
}