Paper 2011/175 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/175 ↗
Analysis of reduced-SHAvite-3-256 v2
Abstract
In this article, we provide the first independent analysis of the (2nd-round tweaked) 256-bit version of the SHA-3 candidate SHAvite-3. By leveraging recently introduced cryptanalysis tools such as rebound attack or Super-Sbox cryptanalysis, we are able to derive chosen-related-salt distinguishing attacks on the compression function on up to 8 rounds (12 rounds in total) and free-start collisions on up to 7 rounds. In particular, our best results are obtained by carefully controlling the differences in the key schedule of the internal cipher. Most of our results have been implemented and verified experimentally.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-04-05: last updated
- 2011-04-05: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/175
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/175,
author = {Marine Minier and Maria Naya-Plasencia and Thomas Peyrin},
title = {Analysis of reduced-SHAvite-3-256 v2},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/175},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/175}
}