Paper 2011/210 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/210 ↗
The preimage security of double-block-length compression functions
Abstract
We give improved bounds on the preimage security of the three ``classical'' double-block-length, double-call, blockcipher-based compression functions, these being Abreast-DM, Tandem-DM and Hirose's scheme. For Hirose's scheme, we show that an adversary must make at least $2^{2n-5}$ blockcipher queries to achieve chance $0.5$ of inverting a randomly chosen point in the range. For Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM we show that at least $2^{2n-10}$ queries are necessary. These bounds improve upon the previous best bounds of $\Omega(2^n)$ queries, and are optimal up to a constant factor since the compression functions in question have range of size $2^{2n}$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-05-06: last updated
- 2011-05-06: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/210
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/210,
author = {Jooyoung Lee and Martijn Stam and John Steinberger},
title = {The preimage security of double-block-length compression functions},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/210},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/210}
}