Paper 2011/252 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/252 ↗
Cryptography Secure Against Related-Key Attacks and Tampering
Abstract
We show how to leverage the RKA (Related-Key Attack) security of blockciphers to provide RKA security for a suite of high-level primitives. This motivates a more general theoretical question, namely, when is it possible to transfer RKA security from a primitive P1 to a primitive P2? We provide both positive and negative answers. What emerges is a broad and high level picture of the way achievability of RKA security varies across primitives, showing, in particular, that some primitives resist ``more'' RKAs than others. A technical challenge was to achieve RKA security even for the practical classes of related-key deriving (RKD) functions underlying fault injection attacks that fail to satisfy the ``claw-freeness'' assumption made in previous works. We surmount this barrier for the first time based on the construction of PRGs that are not only RKA secure but satisfy a new notion of identity-collision-resistance.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-09-06: last updated
- 2011-05-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/252
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/252,
author = {Mihir Bellare and David Cash and Rachel Miller},
title = {Cryptography Secure Against Related-Key Attacks and Tampering},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/252},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/252}
}