Paper 2011/283 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/283 ↗
The Fault Attack ECDLP Revisited
Abstract
Biehl et al.\cite{BMM} proposed a fault-based attack on elliptic curve cryptography. In this paper, we refined the fault attack method. An elliptic curve $E$ is defined over prime field $\mathbb{F}_p$ with base point $P\in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$. Applying the fault attack on these curves, the discrete logarithm on the curve can be computed in subexponential time of $L_p(1/2, 1+o(1))$. The runtime bound relies on heuristics conjecture about smooth numbers similar to the ones used in \cite{Lens}.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-06-03: last updated
- 2011-06-03: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/283
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/283,
author = {Mingqiang Wang and Xiaoyun Wang and Tao Zhan},
title = {The Fault Attack ECDLP Revisited},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/283},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/283}
}