Paper 2011/328 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/328 ↗
Cryptanalysis of the Smart-Vercauteren and Gentry-Halevi’s Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Abstract
For the fully homomorphic encryption schemes in [SV10, GH11], this paper presents attacks to solve equivalent secret key and directly recover plaintext from ciphertext for lattice dimensions n=2048 by using lattice reduction algorithm. According to the average-case behavior of LLL in [NS06], their schemes are also not secure for n=8192.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2012-01-08: last updated
- 2011-06-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/328
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/328,
author = {Gu Chunsheng},
title = {Cryptanalysis of the Smart-Vercauteren and Gentry-Halevi’s Fully Homomorphic Encryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/328},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/328}
}