Paper 2011/350 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/350 ↗
$HB^N$: An HB-like protocol secure against man-in-the-middle attacks
Abstract
We construct a simple authentication protocol whose security is based solely on the problem of Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) which is secure against Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Our protocol is suitable for RFID devices, whose limited circuit size and power constraints rule out the use of more heavyweight operations such as modular exponentiation. The protocol is extremely simple: both parties compute a noisy bilinear function of their inputs. The proof, however, is quite technical, and we believe that some of our technical tools may be of independent interest.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-08-05: last updated
- 2011-07-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/350
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/350,
author = {Carl Bosley and Kristiyan Haralambiev and Antonio Nicolosi},
title = {$HB^N$: An HB-like protocol secure against man-in-the-middle attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/350},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/350}
}