Paper 2011/420 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/420 ↗
Unaligned Rebound Attack - Application to Keccak
Abstract
We analyze the internal permutations of Keccak, one of the NIST SHA-3 competition finalists, in regard to differential properties. By carefully studying the elements composing those permutations, we are able to derive most of the best known differential paths for up to 5 rounds. We use these differential paths in a rebound attack setting and adapt this powerful freedom degrees utilization in order to derive distinguishers for up to 8 rounds of the internal permutations of the submitted version of Keccak. The complexity of the 8 round distinguisher is $2^{491.47}$. Our results have been implemented and verified experimentally on a small version of Keccak. This is currently the best known differential attack against the internal permutations of Keccak.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2012-04-19: last updated
- 2011-08-05: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/420
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/420,
author = {Alexandre Duc and Jian Guo and Thomas Peyrin and Lei Wei},
title = {Unaligned Rebound Attack - Application to Keccak},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/420},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/420}
}