Paper 2011/424 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/424 ↗
Cryptanalysis of AZUMI: an EPC Class-1 Generation-2 Standard Compliant RFID Authentication Protocol
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the security of AZUMI protocol which is compliant with the EPC-Class-1 Generation-2 standard and recently has been proposed by Peris \textit{et al.} This protocol is an improvement to a protocol proposed by Chen and Deng which has been cryptanalysed by Peris \textit{et al.} and Kapoor and Piramuthu. However, our security analysis clearly shows that the designers were not successful in their attempt to improve the Chen and Deng protocol. More precisely, we present an efficient attack to disclose the tag and the reader secret parameters. In addition, we present a simple tag impersonation attack against this protocol. The success probability of all attacks are almost ``1'' and the cost of given attacks are at most eavesdropping two sessions of protocol. However, the given secrets disclosure attack also requires $O(2^{16}) $ off-line evaluation of a $PRNG$ function.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-08-29: last updated
- 2011-08-12: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/424
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/424,
author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Nasour Bagheri and Majid Naderi},
title = {Cryptanalysis of AZUMI: an EPC Class-1 Generation-2 Standard Compliant RFID Authentication Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/424},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/424}
}