Paper 2011/615 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/615 ↗
On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature in EMV
Abstract
We provide an analysis of current and future algorithms for signature and encryption in the EMV standards in the case where a single key-pair is used for both signature and encryption. We give a theoretical attack for EMV's current RSA-based algorithms, showing how access to a partial decryption oracle can be used to forge a signature on a freely chosen message. We show how the attack might be integrated into EMV's CDA protocol flow, enabling an attacker with a wedge device to complete an offline transaction without knowing the cardholder's PIN. Finally, the elliptic curve signature and encryption algorithms that are likely to be adopted in a forthcoming version of the EMV standards are analyzed in the single key-pair setting, and shown to be secure.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-12-16: last updated
- 2011-11-15: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/615
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/615,
author = {Jean Paul Degabriele and Anja Lehmann and Kenneth G. Paterson and Nigel P. Smart and Mario Strefler},
title = {On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature in EMV},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/615},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615}
}