Paper 2011/661 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2011/661 ↗
New Impossible Differential Attacks on Camellia
Abstract
Camellia is one of the most worldwide used block ciphers, which has been selected as a standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, we propose several new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia with 2 $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers, which turn out to be the first 7-round impossible differentials with 2 $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers. Combined with some basic techniques including the early abort approach and the key schedule consideration, we achieve the impossible differential attacks on 11-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192, 12-round Camellia-192, and 14-round Camellia-256, and the time complexity are $2^{123.6}$, $2^{121.7}$, $2^{171.4}$ and $2^{238.2}$ respectively. As far as we know, these are the best results against the reduced-round variants of Camellia. Especially, we give the first attack on 11-round Camellia-128 reduced version with $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-12-09: last updated
- 2011-12-09: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/661
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/661,
author = {Dongxia Bai and Leibo Li},
title = {New Impossible Differential Attacks on Camellia},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2011/661},
year = {2011},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/661}
}