Paper 2012/023 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/023 ↗

On the security of Lo et al.’s ownership transfer protocol

Masoumeh Safkhani
Nasour Bagheri
Majid Naderi
Ali Mahani
Abstract

Recently Lo et al. have proposed an ownership transfer pro- tocol for RFID objects using lightweight computing operators and claim their protocol provides stronger security robustness and higher perfor- mance efficiency in comparison with existing solutions. However, in this paper we show that their claim unfortunately does not hold. More pre- cisely, we present tag’s secret disclosure attack, new owner’s secret disclo- sure and fraud attack against the Lo et al.’s ownership transfer protocol. The success probability of all attacks is “1” while the complexity is only one run of protocol. Our observation shows that this protocol compro- mise the privacy of the tag and the new owner.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2012-02-18: last updated
2012-01-18: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/023
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/023,
      author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Nasour Bagheri and Majid Naderi and Ali Mahani},
      title = {On the security of Lo et al.’s ownership transfer protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/023},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/023}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.