Paper 2012/028 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/028 ↗
A First-Order Leak-Free Masking Countermeasure
Abstract
One protection of cryptographic implementations against side-channel attacks is the masking of the sensitive variables. In this article, we present a first-order masking that does not leak information when the registers change values according to some specific (and realistic) rules. This countermeasure applies to all devices that leak a function of the distance between consecutive values of internal variables. In particular, we illustrate its practicality on both hardware and software implementations. Moreover, we introduce a framework to evaluate the soundness of the new first-order masking when the leakage slightly deviates from the rules involved to design the countermeasure. It reveals that the countermeasure remains more efficient than the state-of-the-art first-order masking if the deviation from the ideal model is equal to a few tens of percents, and that it is as good as a first-order Boolean masking even if the deviation is $50$\%.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2012-01-22: last updated
- 2012-01-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/028
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/028,
author = {Houssem MAGHREBI and Emmanuel PROUFF and Sylvain GUILLEY and Jean-Luc DANGER},
title = {A First-Order Leak-Free Masking Countermeasure},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/028},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/028}
}