Paper 2012/082 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/082 ↗

Semi-Supervised Template Attack

Liran Lerman
Stephane Fernandes Medeiros
Nikita Veshchikov
Cedric Meuter
Gianluca Bontempi
Olivier Markowitch
Abstract

Side channel attacks take advantage of the information leakage in a cryptographic device. A template attack is a family of side channel attacks which is reputed to be extremely effective. This kind of attacks supposes that the attacker can fully control a cryptographic device before attacking a similar one. In this paper, we propose a method based on a semi-supervised learning strategy to relax this assumption. The effectiveness of our proposal is confirmed by software simulations as well as by experiments on a 8-bit microcontroller.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2012-02-23: last updated
2012-02-23: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/082
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/082,
      author = {Liran Lerman and Stephane Fernandes Medeiros and Nikita Veshchikov and Cedric Meuter and Gianluca Bontempi and Olivier Markowitch},
      title = {Semi-Supervised Template Attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/082},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/082}
}
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