Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet

Shahram Khazaei; Björn Terelius; Douglas Wikström

Paper 2012/100 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/100 ↗

Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet

Shahram Khazaei

Björn Terelius

Douglas Wikström

Abstract

We study the heuristically secure mix-net proposed by Puiggalí and Guasch (EVOTE 2010). We present practical attacks on both correctness and privacy for some sets of parameters of the scheme. Although our attacks only allow us to replace a few inputs, or to break the privacy of a few voters, this shows that the scheme can not be proven secure.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2012-02-29: last updated; 2012-02-29: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/100
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/100,
      author = {Shahram Khazaei and Björn Terelius and Douglas Wikström},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/100},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/100}
}