Universally Composable Key-Management

Steve Kremer; Robert Künnemann; Graham Steel

Paper 2012/189 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/189 ↗

Universally Composable Key-Management

Steve Kremer

Robert Künnemann

Graham Steel

Abstract

We present the first universally composable key-management functionality, formalized in the GNUC framework by Hofheinz and Shoup. It allows the enforcement of a wide range of security policies and can be extended by diverse key usage operations with no need to repeat the security proof. We illustrate its use by proving an implementation of a security token secure with respect to arbitrary key-usage operations and explore a proof technique that allows the storage of cryptographic keys externally, a novel development in simulation-based security frameworks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2013-04-11: last updated; 2012-04-11: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/189
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/189,
      author = {Steve Kremer and Robert Künnemann and Graham Steel},
      title = {Universally Composable Key-Management},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/189},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/189}
}