Paper 2012/268 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/268 ↗
On the CCA2 Security of McEliece in the Standard Model
Abstract
In this paper we study public-key encryption schemes based on error-correcting codes that are IND-CCA2 secure in the standard model. In particular, we analyze a protocol due to Dowsley, Muller-Quade and Nascimento, based on a work of Rosen and Segev. The original formulation of the protocol contained some ambiguities and incongruences, which we point out and correct; moreover, the protocol deviates substantially from the work it is based on. We then present a construction which resembles more closely the original Rosen-Segev framework, and show how this can be instantiated with the McEliece scheme.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-09-24: last updated
- 2012-05-21: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/268
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/268,
author = {Edoardo Persichetti},
title = {On the CCA2 Security of McEliece in the Standard Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/268},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/268}
}