Paper 2012/334 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/334 ↗

On the Traceability of Tags in SUAP RFID Authentication Protocols

Masoumeh Safkhani
Nasour Bagheri
Majid Naderi
Abstract

Widespread adoption of RFID technology in all aspects of our life mainly depends on the fixing the privacy concerns of this technology's customers. Using a tagged object should not lead to existence of the tracing possibility. This concern is a challenging issue that has motivated the researchers to propose several authentication protocols to fix the traceability problem in RFID systems and also provide other security requirements. In this paper, we analyze the security of three authentication protocols which have recently been proposed by Morshed et al. Our security analysis clearly highlights important security pitfalls in these protocols which leads to their vulnerability against traceability. The complexity of the proposed attacks are only several runs of the protocols while the adversary's advantages to trace the tagged object are maximal.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2012-06-22: last updated
2012-06-22: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/334
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/334,
      author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Nasour Bagheri and Majid Naderi},
      title = {On the Traceability of Tags in SUAP RFID Authentication Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/334},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/334}
}
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