Paper 2012/382 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/382 ↗
On the Joint Security of Signature and Encryption Schemes under Randomness Reuse: Efficiency and Security Amplification
Abstract
We extend the work of Bellare, Boldyreva and Staddon on the systematic analysis of randomness reuse to construct multi-recipient encryption schemes to the case where randomness is reused across different cryptographic primitives. We find that through the additional binding introduced through randomness reuse, one can actually obtain a security amplification with respect to the standard black-box compositions, and achieve a stronger level of security. We introduce stronger notions of security for encryption and signatures, where challenge messages can depend in a restricted way on the random coins used in encryption, and show that two variants of the KEM/DEM paradigm give rise to encryption schemes that meet this enhanced notion of security. We obtain a very efficient signcryption scheme that is secure against insider attackers without random oracles.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2012-07-11: last updated
- 2012-07-11: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/382
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/382,
author = {Afonso Arriaga and Manuel Barbosa and Pooya Farshim},
title = {On the Joint Security of Signature and Encryption Schemes under Randomness Reuse: Efficiency and Security Amplification},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/382},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/382}
}