Paper 2012/382 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/382 ↗

On the Joint Security of Signature and Encryption Schemes under Randomness Reuse: Efficiency and Security Amplification

Afonso Arriaga
Manuel Barbosa
Pooya Farshim
Abstract

We extend the work of Bellare, Boldyreva and Staddon on the systematic analysis of randomness reuse to construct multi-recipient encryption schemes to the case where randomness is reused across different cryptographic primitives. We find that through the additional binding introduced through randomness reuse, one can actually obtain a security amplification with respect to the standard black-box compositions, and achieve a stronger level of security. We introduce stronger notions of security for encryption and signatures, where challenge messages can depend in a restricted way on the random coins used in encryption, and show that two variants of the KEM/DEM paradigm give rise to encryption schemes that meet this enhanced notion of security. We obtain a very efficient signcryption scheme that is secure against insider attackers without random oracles.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2012-07-11: last updated
2012-07-11: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/382
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/382,
      author = {Afonso Arriaga and Manuel Barbosa and Pooya Farshim},
      title = {On the Joint Security of Signature and Encryption Schemes under Randomness Reuse: Efficiency and Security Amplification},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/382},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/382}
}
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