Paper 2012/399 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/399 ↗

Differential Fault Analysis on Block Cipher Piccolo

Kitae Jeong
Abstract

Piccolo is a 64-bit block cipher suitable for the constrained environments such as wireless sensor network environments. In this paper, we propose differential fault analysis on Piccolo. Based on a random byte fault model, our attack can recover the secret key of Piccolo-80 by using an exhaustive search of 2^{24} and six random byte fault injections on average. It can be simulated on a general PC within a few seconds. In the case of Piccolo-128, we require an exhaustive search of 2^{40} and eight random byte fault injections on average. This attack can be simulated on a general PC within one day. These results are the first known side-channel attack results on them.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2012-07-23: last updated
2012-07-23: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/399
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/399,
      author = {Kitae Jeong},
      title = {Differential Fault Analysis on Block Cipher Piccolo},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/399},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/399}
}
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