Paper 2012/421 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/421 ↗
Security margin evaluation of SHA-3 contest finalists through SAT-based attacks
Abstract
In 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a public contest aiming at the selection of a new standard for a cryptographic hash function. In this paper, the security margin of five SHA-3 finalists is evaluated with an assumption that attacks launched on finalists should be practically verified. A method of attacks applied is called logical cryptanalysis where the original task is expressed as a SATisfiability problem instance. A new toolkit is used to simplify the most arduous stages of this type of cryptanalysis and helps to mount the attacks in a uniform way. In the context of SAT-based attacks, it has been shown that all the finalists have substantially bigger security margin than the current standards SHA-256 and SHA-1. Two other metrics, software performance and hardware efficiency are combined with security results to provide a more comprehensive picture of the SHA-3 finalists.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2012-08-02: last updated
- 2012-08-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/421
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/421,
author = {Ekawat Homsirikamol and Pawel Morawiecki and Marcin Rogawski and Marian Srebrny},
title = {Security margin evaluation of SHA-3 contest finalists through SAT-based attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/421},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/421}
}