Paper 2012/465 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/465 ↗

T-MATCH: Privacy-Preserving Item Matching for Storage-Only RFID Tags

Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui
Erik-Oliver Blass
Refik Molva
Abstract

RFID-based tag matching allows a reader Rk to determine whether two tags Ti and Tj store some attributes that jointly fulfill a boolean constraint. The challenge in designing a matching mechanism is tag privacy. While cheap tags are unable to perform any computation, matching has to be achieved without revealing the tags’ attributes. In this paper, we present T-MATCH, a protocol for secure and privacy preserving RFID tag matching. T-MATCH involves a pair of tags Ti and Tj , a reader Rk, and a backend server S. To ensure tag privacy against Rk and S, T-MATCH employs a new technique based on secure two-party computation that prevents Rk and S from disclosing tag attributes. For tag privacy against eavesdroppers, each tag Ti in T-MATCH stores an IND-CPA encryption of its attribute. Such an encryption allows Rk to update the state of Ti by merely re-encrypting Ti’s ciphertext. T-MATCH targets cheap tags that cannot perform any computation, but are only required to store 150 bytes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2012-08-18: last updated
2012-08-18: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/465
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/465,
      author = {Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui and Erik-Oliver Blass and Refik Molva},
      title = {T-MATCH: Privacy-Preserving Item Matching for Storage-Only RFID Tags},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/465},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/465}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.