Bellcore attack in practice

Andrey Sidorenko; Joachim van den Berg; Remko Foekema; Michiel Grashuis; Jaap de Vos

Paper 2012/553 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/553 ↗

Bellcore attack in practice

Andrey Sidorenko

Joachim van den Berg

Remko Foekema

Michiel Grashuis

Jaap de Vos

Abstract

In this paper we analyze practical aspects of the differential fault attack on RSA published by Boneh, Demillo and Lipton from Bellcore. We focus on the CRT variant, which requires only one faulty signature to be entirely broken provided that no DFA countermeasures are in use. Usually the easiest approach for the attacker is to introduce a fault in one of the two RSA-CRT exponentiations. These are time-consuming and often clearly visible in the power profiles. However, protection of the exponentiations against faults does not always circumvent the Bellcore attack. Our goal is to investigate and classify other possible targets of the attack.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2012-09-27: last updated; 2012-09-27: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/553
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/553,
      author = {Andrey Sidorenko and Joachim van den Berg and Remko Foekema and Michiel Grashuis and Jaap de Vos},
      title = {Bellcore attack in practice},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/553},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/553}
}