An Attack on a Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

Hu Yupu; Wang Fenghe

Paper 2012/561 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/561 ↗

An Attack on a Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

Hu Yupu

Wang Fenghe

Abstract

In this paper we present an attack on a fully homomorphic encryption scheme on PKC2010. We construct a modi¯ed secret key, a modi¯ed decryption algorithm and a subset of the ciphertext space. When the ciphertext is from the subset, we can correctly decrypt it by our modi¯ed secret key and modi¯ed decryption algorithm. We also discuss when our modi¯ed decryption algorithm is e±cient, and when the subset is not negligible.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2012-10-02: last updated; 2012-10-02: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/561
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/561,
      author = {Hu Yupu and Wang Fenghe},
      title = {An Attack on a Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/561},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/561}
}