Paper 2012/591 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/591 ↗
Biclique Cryptanalysis Of PRESENT, LED, And KLEIN
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the resistance of the lightweight ciphers PRESENT, LED, and KLEIN to biclique attacks. Primarily, we describe attacks on the full-round versions PRESENT-80, PRESENT-128, LED-64, LED-128, KLEIN-80, and KLEIN-96. Our attacks have time complexities of $2^{79.49}$, $2^{127.32}$, $2^{63.58}$, $2^{127.42}$, $2^{79.00}$, and $2^{95.18}$ encryptions, respectively. In addition, we consider attacks on round-reduced versions of PRESENT and LED, to show the security margin for which an adversary can obtain an advantage of at least a factor of two compared to exhaustive search.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2013-05-27: last updated
- 2012-10-25: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/591
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/591,
author = {Farzaneh Abed and Christian Forler and Eik List and Stefan Lucks and Jakob Wenzel},
title = {Biclique Cryptanalysis Of PRESENT, LED, And KLEIN},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/591},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/591}
}