Paper 2012/606 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/606 ↗
Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes
Abstract
We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2013-09-11: last updated
- 2012-10-29: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/606
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/606,
author = {Dan Boneh and Mark Zhandry},
title = {Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/606},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/606}
}