Paper 2012/681 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2012/681 ↗

Resilience to Distinguishing Attacks on WG-7 Cipher and Their Generalizations

Guang Gong
Mark Aagaard
Xinxin Fan
Abstract

The stream cipher WG-7 is a lightweight variant of the well-known Welch-Gong (WG) stream cipher family, targeting for resource-constrained devices like RFID tags, smart cards, and wireless sensor nodes. Recently, a distinguishing attack was discovered against the stream cipher WG-7 by Orumiehchiha, Pieprzyk and Steinfeld. In this paper, we extend their work to a general distinguishing attack and suggest criteria to protect the WG stream cipher family from this attack. Our analysis shows that by properly choosing the minimal polynomial of the linear feedback shift register for a WG stream cipher, the general distinguishing attack can be easily thwarted.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2012-12-10: last updated
2012-12-10: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/681
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/681,
      author = {Guang Gong and Mark Aagaard and Xinxin Fan},
      title = {Resilience to Distinguishing Attacks on WG-7 Cipher and Their Generalizations},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/681},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/681}
}
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