Paper 2013/123 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2013/123 ↗
Analysis and Improvement of Lindell's UC-Secure Commitment Schemes
Abstract
In 2011, Lindell proposed an efficient commitment scheme, with a non-interactive opening algorithm, in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. He recently acknowledged a bug in its security analysis for the adaptive case. We analyze the proof of the original paper and propose a simple patch of the scheme. More interestingly, we then modify it and present a more efficient commitment scheme secure in the UC framework, with the same level of security as Lindell's protocol: adaptive corruptions, with erasures. The security is proven in the standard model (with a Common Reference String) under the classical Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our proposal is the most efficient UC-secure commitment proposed to date (in terms of computational workload and communication complexity).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2013-03-05: last updated
- 2013-03-05: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/123
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/123,
author = {Olivier Blazy and Céline Chevalier and David Pointcheval and Damien Vergnaud},
title = {Analysis and Improvement of Lindell's UC-Secure Commitment Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/123},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/123}
}