Paper 2013/214 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2013/214 ↗
Remotegrity: Design and Use of an End-to-End Verifiable Remote Voting System
Abstract
We propose and implement a cryptographically end-to-end verifiable (E2E) remote voting system for absentee voters and report on its deployment in a binding municipal election in Takoma Park, Maryland. Remotegrity is a hybrid mail/internet extension to the Scantegrity in-person voting system, enabling secure, electronic return of vote-by-mail ballots. It provides voters with the ability to detect unauthorized modifications to their cast ballots made by either malicious client software or a corrupt election authority—two threats not previously studied in combination. Not only can the voter detect such changes, they can prove it to a third party without giving up ballot secrecy.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2013-04-15: last updated
- 2013-04-14: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/214
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/214,
author = {Filip Zagorski and Richard T. Carback and David Chaum and Jeremy Clark and Aleksander Essex and Poorvi L. Vora},
title = {Remotegrity: Design and Use of an End-to-End Verifiable Remote Voting System},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/214},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/214}
}