Paper 2013/310 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2013/310 ↗

MinimaLT: Minimal-latency Networking Through Better Security

W. Michael Petullo
Xu Zhang
Jon A. Solworth
Daniel J. Bernstein
Tanja Lange
Abstract

Minimal Latency Tunneling (MinimaLT) is a new network protocol that provides ubiquitous encryption for maximal confidentiality, including protecting packet headers. MinimaLT provides server and user authentication, extensive Denial-of-Service protections, privacy-preserving IP mobility, and fast key erasure. We describe the protocol, demonstrate its performance relative to TLS and unencrypted TCP/IP, and analyze its protections, including its resilience against DoS attacks. By exploiting the properties of its cryptographic protections, MinimaLT is able to eliminate three-way handshakes and thus create connections faster than unencrypted TCP/IP.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2013-10-31: last updated
2013-05-25: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/310
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/310,
      author = {W.  Michael Petullo and Xu Zhang and Jon A.  Solworth and Daniel J.  Bernstein and Tanja Lange},
      title = {MinimaLT: Minimal-latency Networking Through Better Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/310},
      year = {2013},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/310}
}
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