Paper 2013/357 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2013/357 ↗
The LOCAL attack: Cryptanalysis of the authenticated encryption scheme ALE
Abstract
We show how to produce a forged (ciphertext,tag) pair for the scheme ALE with data and time complexity of 2^102 ALE encryptions of short messages and the same number of authentication attempts. We use a differential attack based on a local collision, which exploits the availability of extracted state bytes to the adversary. Our approach allows for a time-data complexity tradeoff, with an extreme case of a forgery produced after $2^119 attempts and based on a single authenticated message. Our attack is further turned into a state recovery and a universal forgery attack with a time complexity of 2^120 verification attempts using only a single authenticated 48-byte message.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2013-06-10: last updated
- 2013-06-10: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/357
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/357,
author = {Dmitry Khovratovich and Christian Rechberger},
title = {The LOCAL attack: Cryptanalysis of the authenticated encryption scheme ALE},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/357},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/357}
}