Paper 2013/561 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2013/561 ↗

Preimage attacks on the round-reduced Keccak with the aid of differential cryptanalysis

Pawel Morawiecki
Josef Pieprzyk
Marian Srebrny
Michal Straus
Abstract

In this paper we use differential cryptanalysis to attack the winner of the SHA-3 competition, namely Keccak hash function. Despite more than 6 years of intensive cryptanalysis there have been known only two preimage attacks which reach 3 (or slightly more) rounds. Our 3-round preimage attack improves the complexity of those two existing attacks and it is obtained with a different technique. We also show the partial preimage attack on the 4-round Keccak, exploiting two properties of the linear step of the Keccak-f permutation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2013-09-04: last updated
2013-09-04: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/561
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/561,
      author = {Pawel Morawiecki and Josef Pieprzyk and Marian Srebrny and Michal Straus},
      title = {Preimage attacks on the round-reduced Keccak with the aid of differential cryptanalysis},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/561},
      year = {2013},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/561}
}
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