Paper 2013/592 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2013/592 ↗
Cryptanalysis of the Toorani-Falahati Hill Ciphers
Abstract
In 2009 and 2011, Toorani and Falahati introduced two variants of the classical Hill Cipher, together with protocols for the exchange of encrypted messages. The designers claim that the new systems overcome the weaknesses of the original Hill Cipher, and are resistant to any ciphertext-only, known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, or chosen-ciphertext attack. However, we describe a chosen-plaintext attack that easily breaks both Toorani-Falahati Hill Ciphers, and we present computational results that confirm the effectiveness of our attack.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2013-09-14: last updated
- 2013-09-14: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/592
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/592,
author = {Liam Keliher and Anthony Z. Delaney},
title = {Cryptanalysis of the Toorani-Falahati Hill Ciphers},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/592},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/592}
}