Paper 2013/655 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2013/655 ↗
Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Reconciliation Secure in the Malicious Model (Extended version)
Abstract
The problem of fair and privacy-preserving ordered set reconciliation arises in a variety of applications like auctions, e-voting, and appointment reconciliation. While several multi-party protocols have been proposed that solve this problem in the semi-honest model, there are no multi-party protocols that are secure in the malicious model so far. In this paper, we close this gap. Our newly proposed protocols are shown to be secure in the malicious model based on a variety of novel non-interactive zero-knowledge-proofs. We describe the implementation of our protocols and evaluate their performance in comparison to protocols solving the problem in the semi-honest case.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2013-10-15: last updated
- 2013-10-15: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/655
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/655,
author = {Georg Neugebauer and Lucas Brutschy and Ulrike Meyer and Susanne Wetzel},
title = {Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Reconciliation Secure in the Malicious Model (Extended version)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/655},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/655}
}