Paper 2013/665 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2013/665 ↗
The Impossibility of Obfuscation with a Universal Simulator
Abstract
We show that indistinguishability obfuscation implies that all functions with sufficient ``pseudo-entropy'' cannot be obfuscated under a virtual black box definition with a universal simulator. Let ${\cal F}=\{f_s\}$ be a circuit family with super-polynomial pseudo-entropy, and suppose ${\cal O}$ is a candidate obfuscator with universal simulator $\Sim$. We demonstrate the existence of an adversary $\Adv$ that, given the obfuscation ${\cal O}(f_s)$, learns a predicate the simulator $\Sim$ cannot learn from the code of $\Adv$ and black-box access to $f_s$. Furthermore, this is true in a strong sense: for \emph{any} secret predicate $P$ that is not learnable from black-box access to $f_s$, there exists an adversary that given ${\cal O}(f_s)$ efficiently recovers $P(s)$, whereas given oracle access to $f_s$ and given the code of the adversary, it is computationally hard to recover $P(s)$. We obtain this result by exploiting a connection between obfuscation with a universal simulator and obfuscation with auxiliary inputs, and by showing new impossibility results for obfuscation with auxiliary inputs.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2014-02-18: last updated
- 2013-10-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/665
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/665,
author = {Henry Cohn and Shafi Goldwasser and Yael Tauman Kalai},
title = {The Impossibility of Obfuscation with a Universal Simulator},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/665},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/665}
}