Paper 2013/842 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2013/842 ↗
Detecting Hidden Leakages
Abstract
Reducing the entropy of the mask is a technique which has been proposed to mitigate the high performance overhead of masked software implementations of symmetric block ciphers. Rotating S-box Masking (RSM) is an example of such schemes applied to AES with the purpose of maintaining the security at least against univariate first-order side-channel attacks. This article examines the vulnerability of a realization of such technique using the side-channel measurements publicly available through DPA contest V4. Our analyses which focus on exploiting the first-order leakage of the implementation discover a couple of potential attacks which can recover the secret key. Indeed the leakage we exploit is due to a design mistake as well as the characteristics of the implementation platform, none of which has been considered during the design of the countermeasure (implemented in naive C code).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2014-03-28: last updated
- 2013-12-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/842
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/842,
author = {Amir Moradi and Sylvain Guilley and Annelie Heuser},
title = {Detecting Hidden Leakages},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/842},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/842}
}