Paper 2014/028 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/028 ↗
Channel Equalization for Side Channel Attacks
Abstract
This paper introduces the use of channel equalization as a method of simplifying side channel analysis attacks, by effectively collapsing all points in a power measurement trace into a single random variable. This uses a simple Finite Impulse Response (FIR) linear equalizer, which has been studied extensively in communications systems. In addition the estimation of a channel model is used in developing the Channel Estimation Analysis (CEA), which is a generic attack requiring similar assumptions to the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack. Both channel equalization and the CEA attack are straight-forward to apply to real systems, and Python examples are provided. Results of attacking unprotected AES-128 and protected AES-256RSM on a microcontroller are provided.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2014-11-24: last updated
- 2014-01-12: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/028
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/028,
author = {Colin O'Flynn and Zhizhang (David) Chen},
title = {Channel Equalization for Side Channel Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/028},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/028}
}