Paper 2014/123 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/123 ↗
FORSAKES: A Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Symmetric Key-Evolving Schemes
Abstract
This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly and irreversibly. Protocols conforming to our model can be highly efficient, since they do not require the resource-intensive modular exponentiations of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. We also introduce a protocol, called FORSAKES, and prove rigorously that it is a forward-secure AKE protocol in our model. FORSAKES is a very efficient protocol, and can be implemented by merely using hash functions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-11-23: last updated
- 2014-02-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/123
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/123,
author = {Mohammad Sadeq Dousti and Rasool Jalili},
title = {FORSAKES: A Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Symmetric Key-Evolving Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/123},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/123}
}