Paper 2014/201 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/201 ↗
From Input Private to Universally Composable Secure Multiparty Computation Primitives
Abstract
Secure multiparty computation systems are commonly built form a small set of primitive components. Composability of security notions has a central role in the analysis of such systems, since it allows us to deduce security properties of complex protocols from the properties of its components. We show that the standard notions of universally composable security are overly restrictive in this context and can lead to protocols with sub-optimal performance. As a remedy, we introduce a weaker notion of privacy that is satisfied by simpler protocols and is preserved by composition. After that we fix a passive security model and show how to convert a private protocol into a universally composable protocol. As a result, we obtain modular security proofs without performance penalties.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2014-05-29: last updated
- 2014-03-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/201
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/201,
author = {Dan Bogdanov and Peeter Laud and Sven Laur and Pille Pullonen},
title = {From Input Private to Universally Composable Secure Multiparty Computation Primitives},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/201},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/201}
}