Paper 2014/216 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/216 ↗

Implementation and Improvement of the Partial Sum Attack on 6-round AES

Francesco Aldà
Riccardo Aragona
Lorenzo Nicolodi
Massimiliano Sala
Abstract

The Partial Sum Attack is one of the most powerful attacks, independent of the key schedule, developed in the last 15 years against reduced-round versions of AES. In this paper, we introduce a slight improvement to the basic attack which lowers the number of chosen plaintexts needed to successfully mount it. Our version of the attack on 6-round AES can be carried out completely in practice, as we demonstrate providing a full implementation. We also detail the structure of our implementation, showing the performances we achieve.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2015-08-26: last updated
2014-03-24: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/216
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/216,
      author = {Francesco Aldà and Riccardo Aragona and Lorenzo Nicolodi and Massimiliano Sala},
      title = {Implementation and Improvement of the Partial Sum Attack on 6-round AES},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/216},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/216}
}
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