Forgery on Stateless CMCC

Guy Barwell

Paper 2014/251 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/251 ↗

Forgery on Stateless CMCC

Guy Barwell

Abstract

We present attacks against CMCC that invalidate the claimed security of integrity protection and misuse resistance. We exploit the fact zero-padding is used on both the message and authenticated data and demonstrate how one may generate a forgery with a single call to the encryption oracle. From this we calculate the ciphertext of the chosen message, yielding a forgery and so breaking INT-CTXT. In the nonce-reuse setting, existence of a forgery leads directly to a 2-query distinguisher.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2014-04-22: last updated; 2014-04-20: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/251
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/251,
      author = {Guy Barwell},
      title = {Forgery on Stateless CMCC},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/251},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/251}
}