Paper 2014/292 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/292 ↗
Improved Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Reduced-Round Camellia-192/256
Abstract
Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, we focus on the key-recovery attacks on reduced-round Camellia-192/256 with meet-in-the-middle methods. We utilize multiset and the differential enumeration methods which are popular to analyse AES in the recent to attack Camellia-192/256. We propose a 7-round property for Camellia-192, and achieve a 12-round attack with $2^{180}$ encryptions, $2^{113}$ chosen plaintexts and $2^{130}$ 128-bit memories. Furthermore, we present an 8-round property for Camellia-256, and apply it to break the 13-round Camellia-256 with $2^{232.7}$ encryptions, $2^{113}$ chosen ciphertexts and $2^{227}$ 128-bit memories.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2014-04-29: last updated
- 2014-04-29: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/292
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/292,
author = {Leibo Li and Keting Jia},
title = {Improved Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Reduced-Round Camellia-192/256},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/292},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/292}
}