Paper 2014/305 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/305 ↗
Collision Attack on 5 Rounds of Grøstl
Abstract
In this article, we describe a novel collision attack for up to 5 rounds of the Grøstl hash function. This significantly improves upon the best previously published results on 3 rounds. By using a new type of differential trail spanning over more than one message block we are able to construct collisions for Grøstl on 4 and 5 rounds with complexity of $2^{67}$ and $2^{120}$, respectively. Both attacks need $2^{64}$ memory. Due to the generic nature of our attack we can even construct meaningful collisions in the chosen-prefix setting with the same attack complexity.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2014-04-30: last updated
- 2014-04-30: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/305
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/305,
author = {Florian Mendel and Vincent Rijmen and Martin Schläffer},
title = {Collision Attack on 5 Rounds of Grøstl},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/305},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/305}
}