Paper 2014/476 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/476 ↗

Simon's Circuit

Paul Baecher
Abstract

Simon mentions in his seminal result separating collision-resistant hash functions from one-way permutations (EUROCRYPT '98), that the wrong strategy to sample collisions can be exploited to invert the permutation. He, however, does not spell out a concrete circuit that demonstrates this. In this short note, we describe and analyze one such circuit.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2014-06-21: last updated
2014-06-21: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/476
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/476,
      author = {Paul Baecher},
      title = {Simon's Circuit},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/476},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/476}
}
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