Paper 2014/504 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/504 ↗
A Provable Security Analysis of Intel's Secure Key RNG
Abstract
We provide the first provable-security analysis of the Intel Secure Key hardware RNG (ISK-RNG), versions of which have appeared in Intel processors since late 2011. To model the ISK-RNG, we generalize the PRNG-with-inputs primitive, introduced Dodis et al. introduced at CCS'13 for their /dev/[u]random analysis. The concrete security bounds we uncover tell a mixed story. We find that ISK-RNG lacks backward-security altogether, and that the forward-security bound for the ``truly random'' bits fetched by the RDSEED instruction is potentially worrisome. On the other hand, we are able to prove stronger forward-security bounds for the pseudorandom bits fetched by the RDRAND instruction. En route to these results, our main technical efforts focus on the way in which ISK-RNG employs CBCMAC as an entropy extractor.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-02-18: last updated
- 2014-06-26: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/504
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/504,
author = {Thomas Shrimpton and R. Seth Terashima},
title = {A Provable Security Analysis of Intel's Secure Key RNG},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/504},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/504}
}