Paper 2014/534 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/534 ↗
Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem
Abstract
This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2014-07-08: last updated
- 2014-07-08: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/534
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/534,
author = {Cong Chen and Thomas Eisenbarth and Ingo von Maurich and Rainer Steinwandt},
title = {Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/534},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/534}
}